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STATUES
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992 as Amended)

1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARIE PENROD
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 940383-CA

DALE PENROD

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

had

original

appellate

j u r i s d i c t i o n in t h i s matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 782a-3(2) ( i ) (1992 as Amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Defendant contends that the trial court committed error
in awarding alimony to the Plaintiff in this case based upon the
criteria established by the Utah appellate courts.
an

alimony

award, the trial

court

is given

In reviewing
considerable

discretion to provide for spousal support, and such an award
will not be over turned on appeal unless there has been a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Bingham v. Bingham, 872

P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1984); Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021
(Utah App. 1993); Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
Secondly, the Defendant contends that the court abused its
discretion

in requiring

the Defendant to maintain a life

insurance policy with a death beefit of $100,000.00.

The

Defendant contends that the trial court intended the life
insurance to secure the alimony award and inasmuch as the alimony

award was improperly imposed, the requirement placed on the
Defendant to maintain a life insurance policy should likewise be
abated.

The Defendant also contends that the amount of any

required life insurance should reflect the present value of the
alimony award.

Trial court's have "considerable discretion in

determining the financial interest of divorced parties."
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993).
P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985).

Hall v.

Jones v. Jones, 700

Accordingly, property and alimony

awards "will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion if demonstrated."

Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d

1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991).
The third issue relates to the trial court's error in
determining that certain property received by the Defendant as
part of his inheritance, became marital property.

Trial courts

should generally award property acquired by inheritance to that
party together with any appreciation or enhancement of its
value.

A trial court's determination is only disturbed where

there is

"a misunderstanding

or misapplication

of the law

resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious
inequity

has

discretion."

resulted

as

to manifest

a clear

abuse

of

Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988);

Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff commenced this action on August 13, 1992,
seeking a decree of divorce and orders relating to real and
2

personal

property,

debts

and

obligations,

alimony,

life

insurance, pension and profit sharing plans and attorney fees.
The Defendant answered the Complaint on September 5, 1992.
An Amended Order resolving the temporary issues in the case was
entered on November 23, 1992.
The matter was tried by the parties on July 28, 1993.

The

court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree
of Divorce on June 14, 1994.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on

June 28, 1994.
PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY OF THE CASE
1.

The Complaint was filed on August 13, 1992 (R. 1-4).

The Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint on September 25,
1992 (R. 36-37).
2.
Show

As a result of a hearing on the Plaintiff's Order to

Cause, the court entered

an Amended Order resolving

the

temporary issues between the parties on November 23, 1992 (R. 4142).
3.

The matter was tried to the Honorable Guy R. Burningham

on July 28, 1993.

After the filing of various objections to the

proposed findings, the court authorized the entry of Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on June 14,
1994 (R. 78-91).
4.

The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 20, 1994 (R. 95).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 10,

1965 (R. 3, 103 at 4 ) .

The parties had three children born as

3

issue of the marriage, all of whom are emancipated (R. 103 at
10).
2.

During the course of the marriage, the Defendant

operated a business known as Dale Penrod Excavating (R. 103 at 78).

The Plaintiff worked at Smith's Food King as a checker

during the last 10 years of the marriage and at the time of trial
was working an average of 36 hours per week (R. 103 at 8-9).
A.

Real Property.

3.

The parties acquired approximately 3 acres of real

property located in Utah County, State of Utah
Exhibit No. 1, R. 103 at 12-13).

(Plaintiff's

The Plaintiff conceded that the

property was inherited by the Defendant

and should be awarded to

him as his own separate property (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10;
Defendant's Exhibit No. 11; R. 103 at 36-38, 47).
4.

In addition, the parties acquired a one-acre parcel

upon which the parties' home was built.

The property was

conveyed to the Plaintiff and Defendant by the Defendant's
father, Leroy W. Penrod on February 3, 1972 (Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 2; R. 103 at 13-14).
conveyed

by both

Defendant's

Subsequently, the one-acre parcel was

the Plaintiff

brother, Mark

and the Defendant

C. Penrod

on January

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3; R. 103 at 14).
testified

to the

31, 1985

The Plaintiff

that the home and property was conveyed to the

Defendant's brother in order to circumvent a judgment from a
lawsuit that had been filed against the Defendant (R. 103 at 1415).

The parties continued to pay the mortgage on the home and
4

property from 1972 to the time of trial and no money was received
from the Defendant's brother at the time of the conveyance (R.
103 at 17-18).

The Plaintiff valued the home and property at

$108,400.00 minus the debt owing on the property of $4,775.00 for
a net value of $103,625.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, R. 103 at
18-19).
5.

The Defendant testified that the one-acre parcel was

given to him by his father as part of his inheritance.

The only

reason that the Plaintiff's name appeared on the deed was to
satisfy the requirements of the financing bank that both the
Plaintiff and the Defendant's name be on the property (R. 103 at
82-83).

The Defendant testified that the value of the lot in

1972 when it was conveyed to him by his father was $15,000.00 (R.
103 at 83-84).
6.

The home and property was appraised as of October 1,

1992 as having a fair-market value of $108,400.00
Exhibit No. 4 ) .
were

located

(Plaintiff's

As depicted on the appraisal, three buildings

on the one-acre

parcel; a house, carport

storage area and a block shop.

with

The block shop was used as part

of the Defendant's business. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4, R. 103
at 20-21).

The portion of the appraised value of the property

attributable

to

the

block

shop

was

$15,000.00

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit No. 4, R. 103 at 21).
B.
7.

Personal Property.
The

Plaintiff

testified

that her

1989

Jeep had

an

appraised value of $10,600.00 with a loan of $2,000.00, for a net
5

value of $8,600.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5, R. 103 at 25).
The Plaintiff valued the lawn mower and the household furniture,
which she wished to be awarded at a total value of $6,000.00
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, R. 103 at 26-27).
8.

The parties stipulated that the appraised value of the

vehicle and equipment to be awarded the Defendant was as follow:
1957

GMC

truck,

($1,800.00);

a 1965

drop

deck

trailer

($5,000.00); and, the 1979 traxcavator ($14,000.00).

A 1985

Dodge truck used by the Defendant had a value of $5,525.00
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, 8; R. 103 at 27-29).

The Plaintiff

testified that the Defendant had a bobtail (a small dumptruck).
In addition the Defendant had a dune buggy and trailer valued at
$3,000.00 and a restored Chevele, valued at $6,000.00 (R. 103 at
29-31).

The Defendant agreed with the values made by the

appraisers.

However the Defendant testified that the Chevele

automobile was worth only three or four thousand dollars.

The

Defendant testified that the body had rust on it, was not
restored to its original condition and was a mosaic of various
parts from different types of vehicles (R. 103 at 85-86).
9.

The

Plaintiff

valued

the Defendant's

tools

$15,000.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9, R. 103 at 31-34).

at
The

Defendant testified that many of the tools were inherited by his
father.

The only tools that were not inherited were comprised of

a welder, a set of torches, compressor, drill press and various
hand tools which the Defendant valued at $2,500.00 (R. 103 at 8687).
6

10.

Additionally the Plaintiff claimed the Defendant had

access to a bank account with a balance of $4,000.00 at the time
of the separation (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9; Defendant's Exhibit
No. 14, R. 103 at 31-34).
11.

The

Plaintiff

also testified

that

she valued

the

Defendant's business at $25,000.00 above the value of the assets
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9, R. 103 at 31-34).

The Defendant

testified that he was the sole proprietor and the only person
involved in the business.
not

The Defendant testified that if he was

associated with the business, the business would have no

income.

Accordingly the Defendant testified that the business

had no value other than the income produced (R. 103 at 84-85).
C.

Debts and Obligations.

12.

The Plaintiff testified that the only debts she was

aware of consisted of the remaining obligation on the house and
the debt owing on the Jeep which she was willing to assume (R.
103 at 33-39).
D.

Alimony.

13.

The Plaintiff testified that she was born on October

18, 1946 and was 46 years of age (R. 62).
14.

The

Plaintiff

testified,

by way

of

her

financial

declaration that she had $1,739.00 in gross monthly income and
$1,230.00 of net monthly income (R. 61).

The Plaintiff conceded

on cross-examination that she had been working nearly full-time
over the past 10 years and had made $19,851.29

($1,654.27 per

month)

to

in

1986

which

by

1992
7

had

escalated

$26,188.41

($2,182.37 per month) (Defendant's Exhibit No. 12; R. 103 at 4748).

In fact, the Plaintiff and Defendant acknowledged that the

income of the Plaintiff and that of the Defendant

(subtracting

only cost of business expense) from 1986 to 1992 was as follows:
Year

Plaintiff

Defendant

1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987

$26,188.41
$23,650.10
$21,358.22
$22,854.73
$19,573.81
$19,071.95

$ 2,890.00
$ 7,231.00
$ 6,387.00
$14,562.00
$17,295.00
$13,724.00

1986

$19,851.29

$19,530.00

Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 12 and 13; R. 103 at 49-53, 74-79.
15.

Although the Plaintiff

testified

that the Defendant

had a drinking problem that kept him from working (R. 103 at 6 ) ,
the Plaintiff acknowledged that two of the Defendant's largest
customers had gone bankrupt.

Additionally the Plaintiff could

not name any specific jobs that the Defendant had turned down (R.
103 at 53-57).
16.

The

Plaintiff

testified

$2,494.00 (R. 58; 103 at 39-41).

her monthly

expenses

were

The Plaintiff also testified

that she had a bulging disc and a spine that was narrowing that
affected her when she stood for a long period of time (R. 103 at
41-42).
17.

At the time of trial, the Defendant Dale Penrod was 47

years of age and had a high school education.
been

an

equipment

operator

for

25 years

The Defendant had
and

owned

his

own

business since 1977 or 1978 (R. 103 at 69-70).
18.

The Defendant testified that his business had decreased
8

because of an increase in competition and his inability to
purchase a backhoe (costing approximately $150,000.00).

The

Defendant testified that there was only limited use for his
traxcavator (R. 103 at 70-72).

The Defendant testified that

several of his major clients had gone out of business including
Mark IV and West America Homes (R. 103 at 71-73).

The Defendant

indicated that he was simply unable to replace the lost major
clients with new ones (R. 103 at 73).
19.

The Defendant testified that he had not turned down

any work and that although he drank on occasion, drinking

did

not affect his work (R. 103 at 73).
20.

The Defendant testified that his gross income through

June 17, 1993 was $9,387.50.

After deducting the cost of gas,

parts, taxes, insurance and utilities totaling $3,384.88, his net
income through five and a half months was $6,002.62 ($1091.38 per
month) (Defendant's Exhibit No. 15, R. 103 at 79-81).
E.
21.

life Insurance.
The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant had a life

insurance policy with Canada Life with a death benefit of
$100,000.00 (R. 60; 103 at 42-43).
F.
22.

Attorney Fees.
The Plaintiff testified that she had incurred attorney

fees in the amount of $2,350.00 (103 at 43).
23.

The Plaintiff acknowledged that she had $1,000.00 in

savings, 15 shares of Smith's Food King stock and 220 shares of
stock in a mutual fund that could be used to pay the attorney
9

fees (R. 103 at 61-66).
24.

The Defendant testified that he had incurred attorney

fees in the amount of approximately $2,000.00 (R. 103 at 89-90).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion
in awarding the Plaintiff alimony.
the parties

The historical earnings of

and the uncontroverted

testimony of both the

Plaintiff and the Defendant establish that the Plaintiff's income
is over twice that of the Defendant.

Additionally, the court's

award of additional temporary alimony amounts to reimburse the
Plaintiff for voluntary contributions to a missionary are clearly
improper and violative of established appellate court guidelines.
Finally, the court's attempt to impute additional monies to the
Defendant does not have any foundation in the testimony and
evidence and are based upon insufficient

findings relating

thereto.
The inclusion of a requirement that the Defendant maintain a
life insurance policy with a death benefit of $100,000.00 naming
the Plaintiff as sole beneficiary, is an abuse of discretion.
The court reasoned that the life insurance requirement was
necessary to secure the Plaintiff's alimony award.

Inasmuch as

there is no foundation in the record to support an award of
alimony, the related requirement to maintain a life insurance
policy should likewise be abated.

If the requirement to maintain

life insurance is somehow affirmed by this Court, the requirement
should be in accordance with the trial court's direction.
10

Specifically the policy should be in an amount not greater than
the present value of the alimony award based upon the Plaintiff's
life expectancy.
Lastly, the Defendant contends that all of the real property
given to him by his father was in fact part of his inheritance
and a gift to him.

The Defendant contends that the trial court

abused its discretion in holding that the one-acre parcel, upon
which the family home was built, was marital property.

The value

of that parcel should have been awarded to him as his own
separate inherited property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING
ALIMONY TO THE PLAINTIFF

A.

Standard of Appellate Review.

The Defendant recognizes that the trial court is given
considerable discretion to provide for spousal support and that
any such award will not be over-turned on appeal unless there has
been a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Bingham v.

Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994); Paffel v. Paffel, 732
P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).
B.

Criteria for the Award of Alimony.

The general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving
spouse from becoming a public charge and to maintain to the
extent possible the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage.

Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11

(1994); Rosendahl v. Rosendahl, 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (1994);
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991).
11

In determining to award alimony and in setting the amount,
the trial court must consider (1) the financial conditions and
needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to provide for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the
payor or spouse to provide support.

Chambers v. Chambers, 840

P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d
84 (Utah App. 1989).
C.

Requirements for Specific Trial Findings.

This Court has made it clear that if there is a factual
basis and if the trial court has made adequate

findings, the

Appellate court will not disturb the trial court's alimony award
unless such a serious inequity has resulted
clear abuse of discretion.
Moreover,

as to manifest a

Schindler, supra.

"in considering

these

factors, the

trial

court is required to make adequate findings on all
material issues, unless the facts in the record are
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the judgment."

?

Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1990) quoting
Throckmorten v. Throckmorten, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988)
quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).
In this case, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree of Divorce are attached as part of the Addendum as Exhibit
I.

The sections relevant to alimony are paragraphs 5 and 15 of

the Findings which are mirrored in paragraph 2 of the Conclusions
and paragraph 2 of the Decree.

Findings numbered 5 and 15 are as
12

follows:
5.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff's monthly

income is $1,779,00 and imputes to the Defendant
monthly income in the sum of $2,383.00.

Defendant's

income is calculated based upon the testimony given at
trial by the Defendant which showed that he worked
twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty percent (60%) of
his employment was billed at the rate of $65.00/hour
and forty percent (40%) of his employment billed at the
rate of $40.00/hour, that he worked nine (9) months
during the year and that one-third (1/3) of his gross
income was attributable to expenses and therefore that
his yearly income amounted to $28,600.00 or $2,383.00
per month.

The Court further finds that Defendant

earns $7,732.00 more than Plaintiff each year.
15.

The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant

were married for over twenty-seven (27) years and that
Plaintiff is in need of alimony and that Defendant
should

pay

to Plaintiff

as alimony

the

$672.00/month said alimony to be permanent.

sum

of

This

finding is based upon the additional expenses which
Plaintiff

presently

incurs

as reflected

on her

Financial Declaration and which she anticipates will be
reduced after ten (10) months and upon the Defendant's
minimal expenses and his ability to pay.
D.

The Trial Court Findings with Regard to the Financial
Conditions and Needs of the Plaintiff are Improper.
13

The trial court made a finding that the Plaintiff's yearly
income was $20,868.00 which equates to a monthly income to a
monthly income of $1,739.00 which is within $40.00 of the amount
recited in paragraph 5 of the Findings (R. 85, 103 at 138).
However, the court did not make either in his oral ruling
from the bench or in the written Findings, Conclusions and
Decree, any specific findings regarding the Plaintiff's monthly
expenses

and needs.

The Plaintiff

submitted

a Financial

Declaration showing monthly expenses of $2,494.00, but the court
did not make any findings relative to those claimed expenses (R.
58-62; 103 at 138-140).
As outlined in the Findings and Decree, the court ordered
the Defendant to pay an increased alimony award for ten months of
$672.00 per month which then was reduced to $322.00 per month
which was to be permanent alimony.

The court's reasoning

employed to support the $672.00 award was totally improper.

The

trial court awarded the extra $350.00 simply to compensate the
Plaintiff for her voluntary contribution to a child on a church
mission.

Although not specifically included in the written

findings, it is clear from the court's oral ruling what he
intended:
The expenses set forth in the Financial
Declaration of the Plaintiff indicates her total
monthly expenses are $2,494.00. Now, of that,
$350.00 represents the amount going to support a
missionary who apparently has been on his mission for
14

fourteen months and would have ten months to go . • .
I am

going to award her $322.00 per month alimony

. what I'm going to do —

it appears she has

supported the missionary since he's been out.

I didn't

hear any other evidence . . . but what I'm going to do
is award temporary alimony in the amount of $672.00 for
ten months . . .
R. 103 at 146-148.
The $350.00 added alimony for the ten month period of time
is clearly improper.

The court is ordering the Defendant to pay

support for an emancipated child.

The parties stipulated and the

Findings reflect that all three children born as issue of the
marriage had attained the age of majority (Finding No. 4, R. 85).
Although U.C.A. 15-2-1 allows a court to order support of a
child to age 21, the court may do so only upon a finding of
necessity

and special or unusual circumstances.

Balls v.

Hackle, 745 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1987); Jackman v. Jackman, 696
P.2d 1191 (Utah 1985); Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197
(Utah App. 1993).

In this case, the trial court simply referred

to the voluntary contribution and made no findings relating to
the child's need for the money or other special circumstances.
It is clear that the child was not suffering from any mental or
physical handicap or impairment.

The court blatantly and

improperly ordered the Defendant to make a voluntary contribution
to his son's mission using alimony as a guise.
In Chambers

v.

Chambers, supra
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the Court noted

the

impropriety of including children expenses into an alimony award.
Inasmuch as the court explicitly tied the Plaintiff's need
for the extra $350.00 to her voluntary contribution to an adult
child, the inclusion of that requirement on the Defendant by way
of an alimony award is clearly outside the mandate of this Court
as to the allowable basis for an award of alimony.
One further item should be noted.

Aside from being an

improper attempt to order child support, the award is improper on
another basis.

This Court has ruled that alimony must be limited

to provide for only basic needs and that a consideration of the
recipient's station in life may be considered only when he is
determined to have adequate resources.

Howell v. Howell, 806

P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991); Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d
538, 542 (Utah 1991).
The award of the $672.00 as temporary alimony is improper in
that it was devised as a means to force the Defendant to
contribute to Plaintiff's voluntary expenditures.

Secondly the

award is a guise for forced child support for an emancipated
child.

Third, the amount exceeds the base needs of the

Plaintiff.
E.

The Trial Court Findings with Regard to the Defendant's
Ability to Pay Alimony are Unsupported by the Evidence
of Actual Earnings in the Case.

In Finding of Fact No. 5, the trial court imputed $2,283.00
of monthly income to the Defendant.

The court does so based upon

the following calculation:
Defendant's

income

is calculated
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based

upon

the

testimony given at trial by the Defendant which showed
that he worked twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty
percent (60%) of his employment was billed at the rate
of $65.00/hour and

forty

percent

(40%)

of

his

employment billed at the rate of $40.00/hour, that he
worked nine (9) months during the year and that onethird (1/3) of his gross income

was

attributable

to

expenses and therefore that his yearly income amounted
to

$28,600.00

or

$2,383.00

per

month.

The

Court

further finds that Defendant earns $7,732.00 more than
Plaintiff each year.
R. 85.
The Finding of the court as it relates to the Defendant's
income has no basis in the record.

Both the Plaintiff and the

Defendant testified that the joint tax returns, signed by both
parties,

demonstrated

Defendant had
monthly

the

following

$19,530.00 of annual

income

of

$1,627.50.

In

income.

In

1986,

the

income which equates to a
1987, the

Defendant

$13,724.00 of income equating to $1,143.00 per month.

had

In 1988,

the annual income was $17,295.00 or $1,431.25 per month.

In

1989, the Defendant's total income was $14,562.00 or $1,213.50
per month.

In 1990, the Defendant's total annual income was

$6,387.00 or $532.25 per month.
The Defendant

had

1991 was only slightly better.

$7,231.00 of income or

$602.58 of monthly

income.

1992 the Defendant's income was $2,890.00 or $240.83 per

month.

The Defendant testified that to the time of trial, his
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net income for five and a half months was $6,002.62 or $1,091.38
per month (R. Defendants Exhibit Nos. 12, 13 and 15; R. 103 at
49-43, 74-79).

As indicated by Defendant's Exhibits 12, 13 and

15 and the graphic made apart of paragraph 14 of the Statement of
Facts in this brief, the Defendant's income has never exceeded
the Plaintiff's income from 1986 to the present.

In fact, the

Plaintiff's income has been at least twice as much as the
Defendants from 1990 to the present.
Based upon the jointly filed tax returns and the failure of
either party to contend that the tax returns did not reflect
their actual income, there is no question that the Plaintiff's
income has historically, without exception, exceeded the income
of the Defendant.

Based upon the actual income of the parties,

no alimony award would be justified.

The court calculated

alimony by taking the alleged difference between the annual
income of the Plaintiff and the Defendant and dividing that
number by twelve and than by two (R. 103 at 146-147).

Obviously

of the Plaintiff's income exceeded that of the Defendant, no
alimony would be due under the standard and analysis employed by
the trial court.
F.

The Trial Court Findings with Regard to the Defendant's
Ability to Pay Alimony are Unsupported by the Evidence
of Imputed Earnings in the Case.

As outlined

above, there is no question that the hard

evidence of actual earnings do not support alimony to the
Plaintiff.

The only remaining analysis is an assessment of

whether there is evidence upon which the court could, in good
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faith, impute additional earnings to the Defendant.
The Plaintiff testified that in her opinion, the Defendant
had a drinking problem, which she surmised interfered with the
Defendant's job performance

(R. 103 at 6 ) .

However, the

Plaintiff acknowledged that the Defendant had an excellent
reputation and that she could not identify one person or client
for whom Dale had refused to work

(R. 103 at 6-7, 53-57).

Although the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant charged
$65.00 an hour on the cat and $40.00 per hour on the truck, she
acknowledged that the Defendant could only work three or four
months out of the year.

In fact, the specific interchange with

the Plaintiff and her counsel is as follows:
Q.

Yet when I look at your tax returns, it doesn't

show that he made $10,000.00 per month for the whole
year.

Can you explain that?

A,

Because he only works three or four months out

of the year.
Q.

So he'd work during the spring and summer?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Then not the rest of the year?

A.

No, not unless he worked on fixing up his

equipment.
R. 103 at 9-10.
The testimony of the Plaintiff is consistent with the
general notion that those persons employed in the construction
field can not work the entire year because of weather and
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temperature considerations.
The Defendant testified that his family has always been in
the equipment operating business and that he had been running his
own business as an excavator since 1977 (R. 103 at 70).

The

Defendant's uncontroverted testimony, which was corroborated by
the Plaintiff, was that his major clients had gone out of
business and that he had been unable to replace them (R. 103 at
54-55, 70-73).

The Defendant testified that West American Homes,

who had been his biggest and only client for a significant period
of time, had gone out of business (R. 103 at 72-73).
The Defendant denied that he had never turned down a job or
been unable to perform because of drinking.

No one had ever

complained about his drinking and never interfered with the
performance of his job (R. 103 at 73).
On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that:
A.

He had worked for five hours the day before the

trial (R. 103 at 94);
B.

That he billed $65.00 per hour for the cat and

tried to charge $35.00 to $40.00 per hour for the
truck (R. 103 at 100);
C.

When asked if he could estimate the percentage

of time he worked at $65.00 per hour versus $35.00
to $40.00 per hour, the Defendant testified that
he worked a little over half to two-thirds with the
cat and the other with the truck (R. 103 at 100-101);
D.

When asked to give an average of the number of
20

hours the Defendant worked a week, the Defendant
testified that he could not.

He stated that some

weeks he worked and some weeks he didn't (R. 103 at
102);
E.

Only when counsel for the Plaintiff asked the

Defendant the number of hours he worked the previous
week, was the Defendant able to answer that he
worked approximately 20 hours (R. 102 at 103).
The trial took place on July 28, 1993.

The only testimony

given by the Defendant above and beyond the hard evidence
contained in the income tax returns and his year-to-date income
statement (Defendant's Exhibit No. 15), was that in the week
preceding July 28, 1993, the Defendant worked 20 hours.
Finding of Fact No. 5 clearly states that

"Defendant's

income is calculated based upon the testimony given at trial by
the Defendant which showed that he worked 20 hours per week."
(R. 85).
There is no question that the court's conclusion that the
Defendant has the ability to make $28,600.00 per year or
$2,383.00 per month is without any basis in the record.

Since

1986, the highest amount made by the Defendant was $19,530.00, in
1986.

The amount imputed by the court is $9,070.00 higher than

any income made by the Defendant to date.

To conclude that

because the Defendant worked 20 hours in a week in July, he was
capable of working that same amount for nearly 40 weeks is clear
error.

Even the Plaintiff testified that the Defendant's work
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was limited to the Spring and Summer months.
It must be remembered that the Defendant is not engaged in
general construction which would allow him to work
approximately nine months of the year.
or digs basements.

during

The Defendant excavates

Obviously that work would be done at a time

of year that would still allow the construction of a home to its
basic

conclusion

before

the onset of

inclement

weather.

Certainly the Plaintiff and Defendant, after having lived with
the business since 1977, know its limitations and both testified
that the excavation season was much more limited than the period
of time pulled from the air by the trial court.

There are simply

no facts, adduced by either party that would support the income
imputed to the Defendant.
This Court has held that findings not supported by the
evidence or those that are rendered in summary form will not be
allowed to stand.
App.

See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah

1990); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App.

1989); Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah App. 1987).
As noted by the Court in Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah
App. 1992), the Court must do more than simply state or conclude
that "the Defendant has the ability to pay."
The Findings made by the trial court clearly fail to meet
the test set out in Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 240 Utah Adv. Rep.
11 (1994):
When the trial court has failed to make findings
on the three factors listed above, we reverse, unless
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pertinent

facts

in

the

record

are

clear,

uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment.

(Emphases added.)

In this case, there are no findings that adequately attempt
to extrapolate from the parties tax returns for eight years to
the amount of income set out in the Findings.
specifics,

the

sustained.

In

Findings

are

insufficient

fact, the evidence

Without those
and

in this case

cannot

be

supports

an

appellate finding that the judgment should be set aside and that
an order be entered abating the award of alimony.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REQUIRING THE DEFENDANT TO MAINTAIN A $100,000 LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY
Paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact states as follows:
Defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance
policy in the sum of $100,000.00 naming the Plaintiff
as the sole beneficiary thereunder.

Defendant is

entitled to the cash value of any life insurance
policies which he owns and is ordered to maintain a
life insurance policy in the sum of $100,000.00
naming the Plaintiff as the sole beneficiary thereunder free and clear from any encumbrances thereon.
R. 82.
The Defendant
maintaining

has

two objections

a life insurance policy.

to the
The

requirement

of

first objection is

that the life insurance was intended by the court as a guarantee
of the Defendant's alimony obligation in the event the Defendant
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preceded the Plaintiff in death.

That fact, although not

detailed in the written findings, is referenced in the court's
ruling from the bench:
MR. PETRO:

So what's the holding then with

regard to life insurance?
THE COURT:

That up to the $100,000.00 amount be

maintained to protect Mrs. Penrod's interest in alimony
for the rest of her life, $322.00 a month.

If the

present value of that is less than $100,000.00, I'll
simply require him to maintain a sufficient amount to
make sure that should something happen to Mr. Penrod,
that she still receives the $322.00 a month.
R. 103 at 149.
Accordingly, if this Court finds that the alimony award to
the Plaintiff is unjustified, the requirement to maintain a life
insurance policy to secure the alimony, should be abated.
The second objection of the Defendant is that the Plaintiff
and her counsel failed to adhere to the instruction of the trial
court.

Judge Burningham clearly instructed counsel to determine

the life expectancy of a person of the Plaintiff's age and
calculate the present value of her alimony award.

The Defendant

was only to be required to maintain a policy that was equal to
the value of the alimony award but did not exceed $100,000.00.
Any casual reference to a life expectancy table under a heading
of a Caucasian woman, age 48, will readily reveal that the
alimony award is way over insured by a policy with a death
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benefit of $100,000,00.
In summary, the requirement to maintain a life insurance
policy should be reversed with a finding by the Court that the
alimony is unjustified•

If for any reason, the life insurance

requirement is maintained, the Defendant should not be required
to maintain insurance with a benefit of more than the present
value of the alimony award (based upon life expectancy tables).
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO COMPENSATE THE DEFENDANT FOR THE ONE-ACRE
PARCEL RECEIVED AS PART OF HIS INHERITANCE
The Plaintiff testified that the approximate three acres of
property located behind the family home was undeveloped and given
to the Defendant by his father, Leroy W. Penrod, as part of his
inheritance.

Based thereon, the court found that the 2.76 acre

parcel should be awarded to the Defendant as his separate
inheritance (Finding of Fact No. 10; R. 84). The court made the
award even though the Defendant had transferred title of the
property to the Plaintiff at the time the Defendant was sued (R.
103 at 44-47).
The Plaintiff testified that the one-acre parcel, upon which
the

family home was built was likewise acquired

from the

Defendant's father, Leroy W. Penrod by way of warrantee deed
dated

February

3, 1972

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 ) .

The

Plaintiff testified that the conveyance was made in order to
allow the building of a home.

The Plaintiff did not testify as

to any conversation with Leroy W. Penrod wherein he acknowledged
that the conveyance was anything other than a gift to Dale as
25

part of his inheritance (R. 103 at 12-14).
The Defendant testified that the one-acre parcel was given
to him by his father and that the only reason the Plaintiff's
name was placed on the deed was to satisfy the bank from whom the
loan to build the house was procured.

The Plaintiff's name was

placed on the deed only to facilitate financing (R. 103 at 8283).

The Defendant testified that the value of the lot at the

time he received it from his father was $15,000.00 (R. 103 at
84).

At the time the property was appraised, the lot was valued

at $35,000.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4 ) .
In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988),
the Utah Supreme Court stated that trial courts should,
Generally award property acquired by one spouse by
gift and inheritance during the marriage (or property
acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse,
together with any appreciation or enhancement of its
value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her
efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby
acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the
property has been consumed or its identity lost
through commingling or exchanges or where the
acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest
therein to the other spouse.
See also, Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994).
As the Court noted in Schaumberg, supra:
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While a trial court has discretion to award inherited
property, such property, "as well as its appreciated
value, is generally regarded as separate from the
marital estate and hence is left with the receiving
spouse in a property division incident to divorce."
See also, Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990);
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d

1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993).

The

Defendant recognizes that the court has authority to award
inherited property to the other party but only in circumstances
where it is done in lieu of alimony and in other extraordinary
situations. Id.
The evidence in this case is that the lot was given to the
Defendant by his father as a gift and as part of his inheritance.
The only reason the Plaintiff's name was put on the property was
to facilitate financing and the procurement of a loan to build a
house.

That lot although used as the site of the family home,

has a value which over time increased
$35,000.00.

from $15,000.00 to

The lot's value was not enhanced by any efforts of

the Plaintiff and can be separately valued a part from the house
and related improvements.
In keeping with the mandate of the appellate court, Finding
No.

7 that the Defendant's father made a joint gift to the

parties should be reversed and the value of the lot, as noted in
the appraisal, should be awarded to the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
The historical earnings of the parties, produced by all
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sides, established that the Plaintiff, since 1986, has made more
money than the Defendant.
made

During the last years, the Plaintiff

from two to eight times the income produced by the

Defendant.

Based upon the uncontroverted evidence, no award of

alimony should have been made to the Plaintiff.

The granting of

an increased temporary alimony award to reimburse the Plaintiff
for contributions to an emancipated child, was clear error.
Finally, there was no factual basis and insufficient findings to
sustain the trial court's imputation of income to the Defendant.
The order of the trial court with regard to life insurance
should be reversed because it is tied to an alimony award that
was improperly

assessed.

Additionally, the amount of life

insurance violated the court's oral mandate and was far in excess
of the present value of the alimony award.
The court's finding that the one-acre parcel constituted
marital property flies in the face of the evidence and the
applicable case law.

The Defendant, as part of the property

settlement, should be awarded the value of the lot, at the time
that the Decree of Divorc^jsgas entered.
DATED this $&*-

day of October, 1994.

u^S^^

Michael J. Petro, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
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copies of the Appellant's Brief were

mailed, postage prepaid to Mr. Brian C. Harrison, Attorney at
Law, 3319 North University Avenue, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84604
on the

S*'

day of October, 1994.
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARIE PENROD
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
-vsDALE PENROD
Defendant.

i

Civil No.

924401632

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 28th
day of July 1993, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney
Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant appearing in person and by his
attorney Michael J* Petro, and the Court having considered the
evidence submitted by the parties and the argument of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant

upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to

become final upon entry.
2.

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff as alimony the sum of

$672.00 per month for ten (10) months after which alimony is
reduced to $322.00 per month, said alimony award to be permanent.
3.

The Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half the

equity in the home and real property of the parties which should be
divided as follows:
a.

The home, carport, and three-quarters (3/4) acre on

which the home and carport are situated is awarded to the
Plaintiff.
b.

The shop plus one-quarter (1/4) acre of the marital

property is awarded to the Defendant.
c.

Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to jointly

petition the City of Provo for a lot split which would
allow the shop and real property awarded to the Defendant
to be attached to the adjoining property owned by the
Defendant and his brother.
4.

Defendant is awarded the 2.76 acres adjacent to the

marital property, as his separate inheritance.
5.

The personal property of the parties is awarded as

follows:
a.

Defendant is awarded the 1979 CAT, 1965 trailer, GMC

truck, Dodge, Bobtail, dune buggy and trailer, Chevelle,
2

shop tools, bank account, family business (Dale Penrod
Excavation), green chair, china closet, and two prints.
b.

Plaintiff

is

awarded

the

remaining

household

furniture and equipment, and Jeep.
6.

Defendant is ordered to record the unrecorded deed

presently held by him covering the marital home and property,
conveying the subject property from Mark Penrod to the Plaintiff
and Defendant herein, and said property is then ordered divided as
herein above specified.
7.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the debts on the

home and real property of the parties and on the Jeep which has
been awarded to her.
8.

Defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance policy

in the sum of $100,000.00 naming the Plaintiff as the sole
beneficiary

thereunder

free and clear

from

any

encumbrances

thereon.
9.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all other marital

debts and obligations incurred by the parties during the marriage.
10.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of the

Smith's stock, Dean Whitter stock, and $500.00 from the joint bank
account of the parties.
11.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of

Plaintiff's pension fund.

Defendant is authorized to prepare a
3

Qualified Domestic Relations Order if the pension fund cannot be
divided in any other fashion.
12.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of

$11,200.00 within six (6) months of the date of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce herein, with interest accruing thereon at the
legal rate of interest from the date of said Decree until paid,
said sum representing the difference between the value of the home
and real property awarded to the Plaintiff and the property awarded
to the Defendant.
13.

Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to pay their own

court costs and legal fees incurred herein.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce on this / / ) '

*-day of

February, 1994, by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Michael J. Petro
101 E. 200 S.
Springville, UT 84663
ecretary
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HILL, HARRISON & HILL
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARIE PENROD
Plaintiff,
|

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsDALE PENROD
Defendant.

Civil No.

924401632

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 28th
day of July 1993, Plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney
Brian C. Harrison, and the Defendant appearing in person and by his
attorney Michael J, Petro, and the Court having considered the
evidence submitted by the parties and the argument of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

are

actual

and

bona-fide

residents of Utah County, State of Utah, and have been for more
than three (3) months immediately prior to the commencement of this

action•
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 10,

1965, in Mapleton, Utah, and are presently married at this time.
3.

Irreconcilable

differences

have

developed

between

Plaintiff and Defendant which have caused the irremedial breakdown
of the marriage.
4.

The parties have had three (3) children born as issue of

the marriage but none of the children are presently under the age
of majority.
5.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff's monthly income is

$1,779.00 and imputes to the Defendant monthly income in the sum of
$2,383.00.

Defendant's income is calculated based upon the

testimony given at trial by the Defendant which showed that he
worked twenty (20) hours per week, that sixty percent (60%) of his
employment was billed at the rate of $65.00/hour and forty percent
(40%) of his employment billed at the rate of $40.00/hour, that he
worked nine (9) months during the year and that one-third (1/3) of
his gross income was attributable to expenses and therefore that
his yearly income amounted to $28,600.00 or $2,383.00 per month.
The Court further finds that Defendant earns $7,732.00 more than
Plaintiff each year.
6.

The Court finds that the ordinary expenses of the

marriage were shared during the marriage and thus both parties
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should be given equal credit for the mortgage payments made on the
home and real property of the parties*
7.

The Court finds that in 1972 the Defendant's father made

a joint gift to Plaintiff and Defendant of the one acre parcel upon
which the parties constructed the marital home.
8.

The Court finds that the present net equity value of the

home and real property of the parties is $103,625.00 and that each
party should be awarded one-half (1/2) of the equity therein.
The Court finds that the Plaintiff has been a homemaker for
over 27 years and has resided in the home of the parties for over
20 years.
The Court further finds that the home, carport, and the threequarters (3/4) acre on which the home and carport are situated
should be awarded to the Plaintiff and that the shop plus onequarter (1/4) acre of the marital property should be awarded to the
Defendant, so long as this division does not violate applicable
zoning ordinances.
9.

The Court finds that the parties should jointly petition

the City of Provo for a lot split which would allow the shop and
real property awarded to the Defendant to be attached to the
adjoining property owned by the Defendant and his brother.
10.

Defendant should be awarded the 2.76 acres adjacent to

the real property of the parties as his separate inheritance which
3

the Court finds is valued at $385,000.00.
11.

With respect to personal property, the Court finds that

Exhibit 9, items 1 - 6 , are not disputed in terms of valuation and
the Court finds accordingly that the personal property to be
awarded to the Defendant is as follows:

12.

a.

1979 CAT

$14r000

b.

1965 Trailer

$

c.

GMC Truck

$18,000

d.

Dodge

$

5,525

e.

Bobtail

$

1,000

f.

Dune buggy and trailer

$

3,000

g-

Chevelle

$

4,000

h.

Shop tools

$

9,000

•
1.

Bank account

$

4,000

•

Family business Dale Penrod Excavation

$

-0-

5,000

In addition, the Court finds that the green chair awarded

to the Defendant is valued at $1,000.00 and that the China Closet
and two prints should be awarded to the Defendant and that the
other household furniture and equipment is valued at $4,000.00, and
should be awarded to the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff should be awarded

her Jeep subject to assuming the debt thereon with an equity value
of $8,600.00.
13.

The Court finds that the unrecorded deed presently held
4

by the Defendant covering the marital home and property should be
recorded, conveying the subject property from Mark Penrod to the
Plaintiff and Defendant herein and that said property should then
be divided pursuant to the Decree herein.
14.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff should assume and pay

the debts on the home and real property of the parties and the Jeep
which are awarded to her.
15.

The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant were married

for over twenty-seven (27) years and that Plaintiff is in need of
alimony and that Defendant should pay to Plaintiff as alimony the
sum of $672.00/month for ten (10) months after which alimony should
be reduced to $322.00/month said alimony to be permanent.

This

finding is based upon the additional expenses which Plaintiff
presently incurs as reflected on her Financial Declaration and
which she anticipates will be reduced after ten (10) months and
upon the Defendant's minimal expenses and his ability to pay.
16.

Defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance policy

in the sum of $100,000.00 naming the Plaintiff

as the sole

beneficiary thereunder. Defendant is entitled to the cash value of
any life insurance policies which he owns and is ordered to
maintain a life insurance policy in the sum of $100,000.00 naming
the Plaintiff as the sole beneficiary thereunder free and clear
from any encumbrances thereon.
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17.

Defendant should assume and pay all other marital debts

and obligations incurred by the parties during the marriage.
18.

Plaintiff and Defendant should each be awarded one-half

of the Smith's stock, and Dean Whitter stock, and $500.00 from the
joint bank account of the parties.
19.

Plaintiff and Defendant should each be awarded one-half

of Plaintiff's pension fund. Defendant is authorized to prepare a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order if the pension fund cannot be
divided in any other fashion.
20.

The Court finds that the net equity in the home and real

property of the parties is $93,475.00 minus the value of the
personal property awarded to the Defendant in the sum of $71,075.00
which equals $22,400.00 in joint marital equity which should be
awarded one-half to each party. Accordingly, Plaintiff should pay
to Defendant the sum of $11,200.00 within six (6) months from the
date of entry of the Decree herein, with interest accruing thereon
at the legal rate of interest from the date of the Decree until
paid.
21.

The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant should each

pay their own court costs and legal fees incurred herein.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant
6

upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to
become final upon entry.
2.

Defendant should pay to Plaintiff as alimony the sum of

$672.00 per month for ten (10) months after which alimony is
reduced to $322.00 per month, said alimony award to be permanent.
3.

The Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half the

equity in the home and real property of the parties which should be
divided as follows:
a.

The home, carport, and three-quarters (3/4) acre on

which the home and carport are situated is awarded to the
Plaintiff.
b.

The shop plus one-quarter (1/4) acre of the marital

property is awarded to the Defendant.
c.

Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to jointly

petition the City of Provo for a lot split which would
allow the shop and real property awarded to the Defendant
to be attached to the adjoining property owned by the
Defendant and his brother.
4.

Defendant is awarded the 2.76 acres adjacent to the

marital property, as his separate inheritance.
5.

The personal property of the parties is awarded as

follows:
a.

Defendant is awarded the 1979 CAT, 1965 trailer, GMC
7

truck, Dodge, Bobtail, dune buggy and trailer, Chevelle,
shop tools, bank account, family business (Dale Penrod
Excavation), green chair, china closet, and two prints,
b.

Plaintiff

is

awarded

the

remaining

household

furniture and equipment, and Jeep.
6.

Defendant is ordered to record the unrecorded deed

presently held by him covering the marital home and property,
conveying the subject property from Mark Penrod to the Plaintiff
and Defendant herein, and said property is then ordered divided as
herein above specified.
7.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the debts on the

home and real property of the parties and on the Jeep which has
been awarded to her.
8.

Defendant is ordered to maintain a life insurance policy

in the sum of $100,000.00 naming the Plaintiff as the sole
beneficiary

thereunder

free

and

clear

from

any

encumbrances

thereon.
9.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all other marital

debts and obligations incurred by the parties during the marriage.
10.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of the

Smith's stock, Dean Whitter stock, and $500.00 from the joint bank
account of the parties.
11.

Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded one-half of
8

Plaintiff's pension fund.

Defendant is authorized to prepare a

Qualified Domestic Relations Order if the pension fund cannot be
divided in any other fashion.
12.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of

$11,200.00 within six (6) months of the date of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce herein, with interest accruing thereon at the
legal rate of interest from the date of said Decree until paid,
said sum representing the difference between the value of the home
and real property awarded to the Plaintiff and the property awarded
to the Defendant.
13.

Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to pay their own

court costs and legal fees incurred herein.

Approved as to form:

Micha^dnr. Petro
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
this /Xrfo—

day of February, 1994, by first-class U.S. mail,

postage prepaid, to the following:
Michael J. Petro
101 E. 200 S.
Springville, UT 84663

/y
-*• Secretary
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Tab 3

DALE PENROD/ MARIE PENROD
Gross Income Before Taxes
1986 through 1992
Year

Marie

Dak

1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986

$26,188.41
$23,650.10
$21,358.22
$22,854.73
$19,573.81
$19,071.95
$19,851.29

$2,890.00
$7,231.00
$6,387.00
$14,562.00
$17,295.00
$13,724.00
$19,530.00

Tab 4

DALE PENROD
EXCAVATING INCOME AND EXPENSES
1/1/93 to 6/17/93
Gross Income to 6/17/93

$9,387.50

Less Expenses:
Gas
Parts and Labor
Tax and License
Insurance
Diesel Fuel
Oil and Grease
Shop Power & Phone
TOTAL EXPENSES
NET INCOME to 6/17/93

$936.22
$500.54
$500.00
$550.00
$414.26
$105.86
$378.00
$3,384.88
6.002.62

